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REFRAMING CHURCH PROPERTY DISPUTES IN 
WASHINGTON STATE 
Theodore G. Lee 
Abstract: Real property disputes between units or members of the same church are common 
in the United States. To resolve such disputes, the Supreme Court has endorsed two doctrines: 
the hierarchical deference approach and the neutral-principles of law approach. The Court has 
justified both doctrines on the First Amendment’s Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, 
but this justification is problematic. Specifically, under the hierarchical deference approach 
courts must always give preferential treatment to one religious group over others—effectively 
endorsing a particular religion. On the other hand, courts can enforce their own interpretations 
of religious issues under the neutral-principles approach, thereby infringing free exercise of 
religious beliefs. And because Washington State courts use both approaches, they also use a 
flawed jurisprudence. To cure these defects, this Comment proposes that Washington State 
courts should treat church property disputes the way they treat property disputes from secular 
nonprofits or fraternity organizations. This streamlined treatment conforms to existing statutes 
and to Washington State Supreme Court precedent. In sum, removing the First Amendment’s 
role is a simple and effective way for Washington State courts to resolve church property 
disputes without violating the federal Constitution. 
INTRODUCTION 
Located a few blocks from busy Downtown Seattle, the First 
Presbyterian Church of Seattle boasts a long history,1 is listed on a popular 
travel guide,2 and has a record of charitable work for the Seattle 
community.3 But in recent years, it also frequently appeared in 
newspapers for legal disputes between its members.4 What began as some 
 
 J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law (Class of 2021). I thank Professor Hugh 
Spitzer and Professor Kathleen McGinnis for their supervision and guidance. I am grateful to my 
Washington Law Review colleagues for their contributions and assistance in refining my Comment. 
Finally, I thank my parents for their love and support. 
1. First Presbyterian Church of Seattle, WASH. SEC’Y OF STATE, https://www.sos.wa.gov/legacy/ 
cities_detail.aspx?i=27 [https://perma.cc/8ZKU-8ETS]. 
2. First Presbyterian Church, TRIPADVISOR, https://www.tripadvisor.com/Attraction_Review-
g60878-d561318-Reviews-First_Presbyterian_Church-Seattle_Washington.html 
[https://perma.cc/5UAK-WAG6]. 
3. Vernal Coleman, New First Hill Shelter Means 100 More Beds in Seattle’s Push to Get People 
off the Streets, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/new-
homeless-shelter-on-first-hill-includes-space-for-100-beds/ [https://perma.cc/85TW-8T6Q]. 
4. E.g., Presbytery of Seattle v. Schulz, 10 Wash. App. 696, 449 P.3d 1077 (2019), denying review, 
195 Wash. 2d 1011, 460 P.3d 177 (2020); see also Nina Shapiro, After Battle Over Downtown Site, 
Pastors Leave, Peace Returns – For Now – at Seattle First Presbyterian, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 6, 
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of its members’ attempt to break away from the church’s parent body,5 the 
internal schism eventually became contentious legal fights over the 
church building, estimated to be worth several millions of dollars.6 
Although the Washington Court of Appeals for Division 1 recently issued 
its ruling,7 the case remains ongoing.8 
Real property9 disputes between churches10 have a long history in the 
United States.11 While state courts predominantly adjudicated church 
property disputes based on their respective state laws,12 the English civil 
court tradition heavily guided state court decisions13 because English legal 
principles were so influential on early American jurisprudence.14 
 
2016), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/for-now-peace-at-seattle-first-presbyterian/ 
[https://perma.cc/B78Z-R8A6]. 
5. Nina Shapiro, Presbyterian Governing Body Orders Pastors to Vacate Downtown Seattle 
Church, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/presbyterian-
governing-body-orders-pastors-to-vacate-downtown-seattle-church/ [https://perma.cc/3LJZ-4XJH]. 
6. Nina Shapiro, Seattle First Presbyterian’s Breakaway Vote Spurs $28.5M Real-Estate Fight, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 20, 2015), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/seattle-first-
presbyterians-breakaway-vote-spurs-fight-over-real-estate/ [https://perma.cc/V7RY-P3U6]. 
7. Presbytery of Seattle, 10 Wash. App. at 718, 449 P.3d at 1089 (affirming the trial court’s ruling 
that disputed church property belonged to First Presbyterian Church’s parent body). 
8. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Presbytery of Seattle, 10 Wash. App. 696, 449 P.3d 1077 (No. 20-
261). 
9. “Land and anything growing on, attached to, or erected on it, excluding anything that may be 
severed without injury to the land.” Property, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
10. I limit the scope of the term “church” in this Comment to Christian entities. However, “church” 
is not exclusively associated with the Christian faith. See Church, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th 
ed. 2019) (defining church as “loosely, a building dedicated to any type of religious worship” and 
“[e]cclesiastical authority or power, as opposed to the powers of a civil government” (emphasis 
added)). Interestingly, even secular organizations have claimed the word “church” for themselves. 
See Faith Hill, They Tried to Start a Church Without God. For a While, It Worked., THE ATL. (July 
21, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/07/secular-churches-rethink-their-sales-
pitch/594109/ [https://perma.cc/X44C-FUDQ]. 
11. See Baker v. Fales, 16 Mass. 488 (1820); Trs. of Organ Meeting House v. Seaford, 16 N.C. (1 
Dev. Eq.) 453 (1830); Miller v. Gable, 2 Denio 492 (N.Y. 1845); Unangst v. Shortz, 5 Whart. 506 
(Pa. 1840). 
12. Eric G. Osborne & Michael D. Bush, Rethinking Deference: How the History of Church 
Property Disputes Call into Question Long-Standing First Amendment Doctrine, 69 SMU L. REV. 
811, 814 (2016) (“Prior to Watson, state courts handled church property disputes, but previous 
disputes were local and centered on specific issues of state law.”).  
13. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 705 (1871) (stating that the English doctrine had been 
“accepted in all cases of this nature in England, Scotland, and America”). 
14. See A.E. DICK HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 268 (1968) (“Blackstone’s Commentaries were published in 
America as early as 1771–72, and at least a thousand copies of the English edition had been imported 
before that time. And with the advent of law professors and law schools in America, Blackstone 
proved a ready tool for teaching law.”); Randy J. Holland, Anglo-American Templars: Common Law 
Crusaders, 8 DEL. L. REV. 137, 138 (2006) (“[H]istory reflects that the common denominator of the 
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The United States Supreme Court ended the lingering English influence 
in 1871 when it decided in Watson v. Jones15 to adopt a doctrine now 
known as the hierarchical deference approach.16 The Supreme Court 
continuously affirmed the deference approach17 into the 1970s.18 Then, in 
1979, the Supreme Court approved a second doctrine to interpret church 
property disputes in Jones v. Wolf19—the neutral-principles of law 
approach.20 However, rather than invalidating the deference approach, the 
Supreme Court allowed states to use either doctrine.21 This freedom 
created the current jurisdictional split in which most states: (1) adopt only 
 
Anglo-American legal system is the English common law. The fundamental principles found in the 
Magna Carta, 1628 Petition of Right, 1689 English Bill of Rights, United States’ Bill of Rights, and 
the rights set forth in our respective written and unwritten constitutions all have common 
law origins.”). 
15. 80 U.S. 679 (1871). 
16. Osborne & Bush, supra note 12, at 817 (“[T]he Watson Court established the ‘hierarchical 
deference’ principle . . . .”). 
17. “Deference approach” is a commonly used shortened version of “hierarchical deference 
approach.” See, e.g., Scotts Afr. Union Methodist Protestant Church v. Conf. of Afr. Union First 
Colored Methodist Protestant Church, 98 F.3d 78, 87 (3d Cir. 1996) (“The Watson approach is 
popularly termed the ‘deference’ approach, and requires judicial recognition of the decisions of a 
hierarchical church’s highest body on matters of discipline, faith or ecclesiastical rule, custom or 
law.”); W. COLE DURHAM & ROBERT SMITH, RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW § 5:15 (1st 
ed. 2017) (“[T]he autonomy of the religious community should be respected, either by deferring to 
its normal decision-making procedures (the deference approach) . . . .”). 
18. See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 
(1976) (reaffirming that civil courts are to accept the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal 
within a hierarchical church); Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l 
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (“But First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized 
when church property litigation is made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over 
religious doctrines and practice. . . . Hence, States, religious organizations, and individuals must 
structure relationships involving church property so as not to require the civil courts to resolve 
ecclesiastical questions.”); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 
U.S. 94, 120–21 (1952) (“Even in those cases when the property right follows as an incident from 
decisions of the church custom or law on ecclesiastical issues, the church rule controls.”). 
19. 443 U.S. 595 (1979). 
20. Id. at 604. 
21. Id. at 604–05 (holding that states are entitled to adopt the neutral-principles approach without 
invalidating the deference approach). 
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the deference approach,22 (2) adopt only the neutral-principles approach,23 
or (3) employ a hybrid model of both approaches.24 
Under the deference approach, civil courts cannot assess the validity of 
a church body’s adjudication on ecclesiastical matters.25 Thus, when a 
church body decides the ownership of church properties on religious 
grounds, courts have no discretion to overrule the church’s decision on 
 
22. See generally Mills v. Baldwin, 362 So. 2d 2, 6–7 (Fla. 1978), vacated and remanded, 443 U.S. 
914 (1979), reinstated, 377 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 983 (1980); Bennison v. 
Sharp, 329 N.W.2d 466, 474 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); Tea v. Protestant Episcopal Church, 610 P.2d 
182, 184 (Nev. 1980); Diocese of Newark v. Burns, 417 A.2d 31, 33–34 (N.J. 1980); Daniel v. Wray, 
580 S.E.2d 711, 717 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003); Presbytery of Cimarron v. Westminster Presbyterian 
Church of Enid, 515 P.2d 211, 216–17 (Okla. 1973); Presbytery of Seattle, Inc. v. Rohrbaugh, 79 
Wash. 2d 367, 372–73, 485 P.2d 615, 619 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 996 (1972), reh’g denied, 
405 U.S. 996 (1972); Church of God of Madison v. Noel, 318 S.E.2d 920, 923–24 (W. Va. 1984). 
23. See generally Harris v. Apostolic Overcoming Holy Church of God, Inc., 457 So. 2d 385, 387 
(Ala. 1984); Ark. Presbytery of Cumberland Presbyterian Church v. Hudson, 40 S.W.3d 301, 304 
(Ark. 2001); Episcopal Church in Diocese of Conn. v. Gauss, 28 A.3d 302, 316 (Conn. 2011); E. Lake 
Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc. v. Trs. of Peninsula-Del. Ann. Conf. of the United Methodist 
Church, Inc., 731 A.2d 798, 806–07 (Del. 1999); Williams v. Bd. of Trs. of Mount Jezreel Baptist 
Church, 589 A.2d 901, 908 (D.C. 1991); First Evangelical Methodist Church of Lafayette v. Clinton, 
360 S.E.2d 584, 585 (Ga. 1987); York v. First Presbyterian Church of Anna, 474 N.E.2d 716, 720 
(Ill. 1984); Presbytery of Ohio Valley, Inc. v. OPC, Inc., 973 N.E.2d 1099, 1107 (Ind. 2012); 
Bjorkman v. Protestant Episcopal Church in U.S. of Diocese of Lexington, 759 S.W.2d 583, 584 (Ky. 
1988); Graffam v. Wray, 437 A.2d 627, 634 (Me. 1981); Piletich v. Deretich, 328 N.W.2d 696, 701 
(Minn. 1982); Church of God Pentecostal, Inc. v. Freewill Pentecostal Church of God, Inc., 96-CA-
00922-SCT (Miss. 1998), 716 So. 2d 200, 206; Presbytery of Elijah Parish Lovejoy v. Jaeggi, 682 
S.W.2d 465, 467 (Mo. 1984) (en banc); Miller v. Cath. Diocese of Great Falls, 728 P.2d 794, 796 
(Mont. 1986); Berthiaume v. McCormack, 891 A.2d 539, 544–47 (N.H. 2006); First Presbyterian 
Church v. United Presbyterian Church in U.S., 464 N.E.2d 454, 459–60 (N.Y. 1984); S. Ohio State 
Exec. Offs. of Church of God v. Fairborn Church of God, 573 N.E.2d 172, 180 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989); 
In re Church of St. James the Less, 888 A.2d 795, 810 (Pa. 2005); Pearson v. Church of God, 478 
S.E.2d 849, 853 (S.C. 1996); Foss v. Dykstra, 319 N.W.2d 499, 500 (S.D. 1982); Wis. Conf. Bd. of 
Trs. of the United Methodist Church, Inc. v. Culver, 2001 WI 55, 243 Wis. 2d 394, 627 N.W.2d 
469, 475. 
24. See generally St. Paul Church, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Alaska Missionary Conf. of United 
Methodist Church, Inc., 145 P.3d 541, 551–53 (Alaska 2006); In re Episcopal Church Cases, 198 
P.3d 66, 78 (Cal. 2009); Bishop & Diocese of Colo. v. Mote, 716 P.2d 85, 90 (Colo. 1986); Fonken 
v. Cmty. Church of Kamrar, 339 N.W.2d 810, 814 (Iowa 1983); Fluker Cmty. Church v. Hitchens, 
419 So. 2d 445, 447–48 (La. 1982); Presbytery of Balt. of United Presbyterian Church v. Babcock 
Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 449 A.2d 1190, 1192 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982), aff’d, 464 A.2d 1008 
(Md. 1983); Fortin v. Roman Cath. Bishop of Worcester, 625 N.E.2d 1352, 1356–57 (Mass. 1994); 
Hope Presbyterian Church of Rogue River v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 291 P.3d 711, 720 (Or. 
2012); Episcopal Diocese of Forth Worth v. Episcopal Church, 422 S.W.3d 646, 651 (Tex. 2013); 
Church of God in Christ, Inc. v. L. M. Haley Ministries, Inc., 531 S.W.3d 146, 170 (Tenn. 2017); 
Reid v. Gholson, 327 S.E.2d 107, 112–13 (Va. 1985). 
25. “A matter that concerns church doctrine, creed, or form of worship, or the adoption and 
enforcement, within a religious association, of laws and regulations to govern the membership, 
including the power to exclude from such an association those deemed unworthy of membership.” 
Ecclesiastical Matter, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
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the property ownership.26 The neutral-principles of law approach operates 
differently because courts only use it when disputes over ecclesiastical 
matters are not involved. Therefore, courts applying the neutral-principles 
approach do not need to defer to a church body’s decisions on property 
ownership.27 Instead, courts employ traditional trust and property law 
principles to resolve church property disputes.28 Finally, the hybrid model 
strikes a middle ground between the deference and the neutral-principles 
approaches by adopting the more deferential application of the latter.29 
Although the deference and neutral-principles approaches differ in 
operation, they share the common legal justification of conforming with 
the First Amendment’s two religion clauses30—the Establishment Clause 
and the Free Exercise Clause.31 Ironically, the First Amendment-based 
justification tends to make civil courts violate the religious clauses.32 The 
deference approach requires greater judicial deference to hierarchically 
structured churches that non-hierarchical churches do not enjoy.33 And the 
neutral-principles approach invites courts to make secular interpretations 
 
26. See Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 
U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (“[T]he First Amendment severely circumscribes the role that civil courts may 
play in resolving church property disputes. . . . [T]he Amendment therefore commands civil courts to 
decide church property disputes without resolving underlying controversies over religious doctrine.”).  
27. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 605 (1979) (“We cannot agree, however, that the First Amendment 
requires the States to adopt a rule of compulsory deference to religious authority in resolving church 
property disputes, even where no issue of doctrinal controversy is involved.”). 
28. Id. at 603 (“The [neutral-principles approach] relies exclusively on objective, well-established 
concepts of trust and property law familiar to lawyers and judges.”); see also Erdman v. Chapel Hill 
Presbyterian Church, 175 Wash. 2d 659, 675, 286 P.3d 357, 367 (2012) (explaining that under the 
neutral-principles approach courts use tools such as “language in deeds, terms of church charters, 
state statutes governing the holding of church property, and the provisions in a particular church 
constitution concerning ownership and control of church property”).  
29. E.g., Fluker Cmty. Church, 419 So. 2d at 447–48 (endorsing neutral-principles approach but 
applying presumptive rule of majority in favor of the hierarchical organization); see also Patty 
Gerstenblith, Civil Court Resolution of Property Disputes Among Religious Organizations, 39 AM. 
U. L. REV. 513, 536–37 (1990) (explaining that courts using the hybrid model expressly adopt the 
neutral-principles approach but nonetheless show deference to hierarchical church’s decisions); 
Jeffrey B. Hassler, Comment, A Multitude of Sins? Constitutional Standards for Legal Resolution of 
Church Property Disputes in a Time of Escalating Intradenominational Strife, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 399, 
423–26 (2008) (explaining the hybrid model).  
30. Jones, 443 U.S. at 602 (explaining that First Amendment prohibits civil courts from engaging 
in purely ecclesiastical affairs); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 733–34 (1871) (stating that civil courts 
must not deprive church bodies their right to settle matters that concern all ecclesiastical questions).  
31. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”); Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 591 U.S. __, 140 
S. Ct. 2246, 2254 (2020) (describing two clauses as Establishment Clause and Free Exercise 
Clause, respectively).  
32. See infra section II.C. 
33. See infra section III.C.1. 
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of documents implicating religious affairs, such as church constitutions.34 
To address these problems, this Comment proposes that Washington 
State courts replace the First Amendment’s role in church property 
disputes with legal principles that govern property disputes from secular, 
voluntarily associated organizations.35 This solution would work for two 
main reasons. First, such organizations share similar structural 
characteristics with churches. That similarity makes importing legal 
principles used to settle property disputes between secular organization to 
the church property context easy for courts. Second, in civil disputes 
involving voluntarily associated organizations, courts either require 
internal adjudicatory procedures to govern or examine governing 
documents to decide which party should prevail. Compelling the disputing 
parties to first rely on available internal adjudicatory procedures functions 
similarly as the deference approach, while examining governing 
documents resembles what courts do under the neutral-principles 
approach. And because voluntarily associated organizations are secular, 
no First Amendment justification is necessary. 
Washington State law classifies churches as nonprofit organizations 
and nonprofits as voluntarily associated organizations. Washington State 
Supreme Court precedent recognizes that while churches are not the same 
as secular nonprofits, churches are undoubtedly subject to state 
regulations in the same way as their secular counterparts. Thus, by treating 
church property disputes in the same manner as similar disputes from 
voluntarily associated organizations, Washington State courts can resolve 
church property disputes without risking First Amendment violations. 
This Comment proceeds with Part I that explains the basic concepts 
germane to church property disputes. Part II traces the two doctrines’ 
genesis, as well as discussing their operation and flaws. Part III focuses 
on how Washington State courts resolve church and non-church property 
disputes and proposes that the methodological similarities justify 
removing the First Amendment from church property disputes. Last, 
Part IV expands on the proposed solution’s application, ultimately calling 
for Washington State courts to replace the First Amendment’s role in 
church property disputes with legal principles governing property disputes 
from secular, voluntarily associated organizations. 
 
34. See infra section II.C.2. 
35. In proposing the solution, this Comment does not discount the potential merits or wisdom of 
other alternatives, such as categorically invalidating the deference approach in favor of the neutral-
principles approach, or vice versa. 
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I. THE BASICS OF CHURCH PROPERTY DISPUTES 
A church property dispute refers to a legal fight over real property 
between two or more Christian-entities. There are two main types of 
church property disputes: those that involve hierarchical churches and 
those that involve congregational churches. The two distinctions are 
further categorized into those that originate from disputes over religious 
matters and those that do not. Depending on the dispute type, different 
legal principles are involved. The main legal principles include 
constitutional, property, contract, and business organization law. This Part 
explains the basic ideas related to the major terminology and concepts that 
are central and indispensable when analyzing church property 
dispute cases. 
A. Church Structure Types and Presence of Ecclesiastical Matters 
The two most common church types in church property disputes are 
hierarchical and congregational. The former refers to churches with a 
vertically structured hierarchy.36 The most prominent hierarchical church 
is the Roman Catholic Church, which is organized as ascending levels of 
authority that starts with the local parish and ends with the papacy at the 
apex.37 Conversely, congregational churches do not have tiers of authority 
over the local church. In other words, a local congregational church 
independently governs its own affairs without another church body 
supervising it.38 Numerous Christian churches identify as congregational, 
including the Baptist Church.39 
The church structure type matters because courts employ different 
analyses depending on the church type. For instance, courts have 
consistently applied the deference approach to disputes that involve 
hierarchical churches.40 Courts similarly link the neutral-principles 
approach to disputes that involve congregational churches, but to a lesser 
 
36. See Gerstenblith, supra note 29, at 523. 
37. See Structure of the Church, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/ 
topic/Roman-Catholicism/Structure-of-the-church [https://perma.cc/UZ5L-2QW3] (explaining 
Roman Catholic hierarchical structure with the papacy at apex). 
38. See Gerstenblith, supra note 29, at 523.  
39. Baptist Churches, BBC (June 25, 2009), https://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/ 
christianity/subdivisions/baptist_1.shtml [https://perma.cc/4X5H-EA78]; see also Note, Judicial 
Intervention in Disputes over the Use of Church Property, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1142, 1143 n.11 (1962) 
(list of Christian denominations classified as congregational). 
40. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976); 
Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 
449 (1969); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 120–
21 (1952).  
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degree than they do with the deference approach to hierarchical 
churches.41 Additionally, the nature of the underlying dispute—whether 
the dispute originates from internal strife over ecclesiastical matters—is 
important for courts because it dictates how involved civil courts may 
become when resolving church property disputes. 
The term “ecclesiastical matters” is somewhat nebulous, but generally 
refers to matters that are religious in nature.42 The ecclesiastical abstention 
doctrine, born out of Watson, Jones, and their progeny,43 commands that 
“civil courts may not redetermine the correctness of an interpretation of 
canonical text or some decision relating to government of the religious 
polity” and directs courts to “accept as a given whatever the entity 
decides.”44 Hence, the doctrine categorically denies civil courts 
questioning the correctness or reasonableness of church decisions on 
property ownership that hinge on adjudication of ecclesiastical matters.45 
What constitutes “secular” is less clear. Black’s Law Dictionary defines 
it as “[w]ordly, as distinguished from spiritual.”46 In turn, it defines 
spiritual as “[o]f, relating to, or involving ecclesiastical rather than secular 
matters.”47 Synthesizing the three definitions of “ecclesiastical,” 
“secular,” and “spiritual” therefore implies that theoretically, any affair 
that is not ecclesiastical is secular. 
B. Legal Principles Pertinent in Resolving Church Property Disputes: 
Religion Clauses, Contract Law, and Property Law 
Once courts determine the church-structure type and the nature of the 
church property dispute’s underlying issue, they apply various legal 
principles accordingly. The most prevalent are the First Amendment’s two 
 
41. Compare Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 724 (1871) (requiring courts to apply the neutral-
principles approach’s concepts to congregational churches), with Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 607–
610 (1979) (expressing that applying majority-rule to disputes from hierarchical churches would be 
consistent with the neutral-principles approach). 
42. See Ecclesiastical Matter, supra note 25 (discussing the definition of the term 
“ecclesiastical matters”). 
43. See Puri v. Khalsa, 844 F.3d 1152, 1162 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining origin of ecclesiastical 
abstention doctrine). 
44. Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 819 F.2d 875, 878 n.1 (9th Cir. 1987); 
cf. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86–87 (1944) (holding courts will not inquire as to truth or 
sincerity of religious beliefs). 
45. Jones, 443 U.S. at 604 (“If . . . the interpretation of the instruments of [church property] 
ownership would require the civil court to resolve a religious controversy, then the court must defer 
to the resolution of the doctrinal issue by the authoritative ecclesiastical body.”).  
46. Secular, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
47. Spiritual, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
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religion clauses, which have been fully incorporated to states.48 The 
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause work together to 
achieve different, but related, purposes.49 The former textually commands 
the government to not make laws respecting50 an establishment of 
religion.51 But the command “does not wholly preclude the government 
from referencing religion.”52 Instead, the requirement is to maintain 
“neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and 
nonreligion.”53 This neutrality requirement stands for the proposition that 
“[t]he law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, 
the establishment of no sect.”54 Stated differently, neither a state nor the 
federal government should be involved in setting up a church or act in a 
manner that discriminates between religion or between religion 
and nonreligion.55 
The Free Exercise Clause’s focus is slightly different than its 
companion. Its purpose is to “secure religious liberty . . . by prohibiting 
any invasions thereof by civil authority.”56 Therefore, the clause applies 
when a government action “discriminates against some or all religious 
beliefs,” or when it “regulates or prohibits conduct because it is 
 
48. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
49. The Court has recognized that the two clauses can conflict with each other when taken to the 
logical extreme. Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 668–69 (1970). However, the Court 
rejected a rigid view of the two clauses’ operation, stating “we will not tolerate either governmentally 
established religion or governmental interference with religion. Short of those expressly proscribed 
governmental acts[,] there is room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which 
will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference.” Id. at 669. The 
Court has subsequently interpreted this general proscription to mean “there are some state actions 
permitted by the Establishment Clause but not required by the Free Exercise Clause.” Locke v. Davey, 
540 U.S. 712, 719 (2004) (citing Walz, 397 U.S. 664). 
50. The term “respecting” encompasses, but is not limited to, endorsing religion or a particular 
religion. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 620 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring) (“[T]he 
constitutional language forbidding laws ‘respecting an establishment of religion’ is not pellucid. But 
virtually everyone acknowledges that the Clause bans more than formal establishments of religion in 
the traditional sense . . . . This much follows from the Framers’ explicit rejection of simpler 
provisions prohibiting either the establishment of a religion or laws ‘establishing a religion’ in favor 
of the broader ban on laws ‘respecting an establishment of religion.’” (citation omitted)). 
51. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .” U.S. CONST. 
amend. I. 
52. Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 954, 971 (9th Cir. 2011). 
53. McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005). 
54. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 728 
(1871)); see also Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 8 (1989) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he 
Constitution prohibits, at the very least, legislation that constitutes an endorsement of one or another 
set of religious beliefs or of religion generally.”). 
55. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).  
56. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963). 
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undertaken for religious reasons.”57 Over the years, the Court has 
prohibited governmental acts that violate the clause,58 such as compelling 
certain religious beliefs,59 penalizing groups for holding views that 
government authorities disagree with,60 or using the tax power to inhibit 
dissemination of particular religious views.61 
The two clauses together form the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.62 
The doctrine recognizes religious organizations’ right to matters regarding 
faith, theological doctrine, and church governance.63 The doctrine thus 
prohibits civil courts from interfering in purely ecclesiastical or 
administrative affairs of a church, inquiring what church rules are, or 
determining whether they have been correctly applied.64 Finally, the 
doctrine prohibits civil courts from resolving church disputes based on 
religion and religious practices.65 
The First Amendment jurisprudence is the most fundamental basis for 
any legal matters concerning religious organizations. But for church 
property disputes, contract, property, and trust laws also provide 
important legal principles. For instance, the contract law principle of 
enforcing what parties agreed to, such as how to govern and be governed, 
is called on when reviewing church property disputes with hierarchical 
church parties.66 Thus, the deference approach underscores the need to 
respect the existing hierarchy of authority to bind lower church units to 
 
57. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993) (plurality 
opinion); see also Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 148 (1987) 
(Stevens, J., concurring). 
58. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963), abrogation recognized on other grounds by 
Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 (2015). 
59. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961). 
60. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953). 
61. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 113 (1943). 
62. The doctrine is also known as the church autonomy doctrine. See Marjorie A. Shields, 
Annotation, Constitution and Application of Church Autonomy Doctrine, 123 A.L.R. 385, § 2 (2004). 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. The difference between “religion” and “religious practice” is subtle but defined. See EEOC 
v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2032 (2015) (“The word ‘religion’ 
is defined to ‘includ[e] all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an 
employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to’ a ‘religious observance or 
practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e(j))).  
66. See Gonzalez v. Roman Cath. Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1929) (“In the absence 
of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of the proper church tribunals on matters purely 
ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular courts as 
conclusive, because the parties in interest made them so by contract or otherwise.” (emphasis added)), 
abrogated on other grounds by Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 
U.S. 696, 712 (1976) (characterizing fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness exceptions as dicta). 
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their decisions. Although similar contract law principles apply in 
congregational church disputes, the absence of hierarchical structure leads 
to a slightly different application. In such situations, courts focus instead 
on whether a church is governed by majority rule. If so, courts will enforce 
the majority’s decision.67 Additionally, the neutral-principles of law 
approach relies on traditional trust and property law principles that require 
examination of relevant documents, including title or deeds to property, 
as well as business organization laws regarding charters or bylaws.68 
The complex layers inherent in church property disputes are no 
accident. American civil courts wrestled with different methods of 
resolution from the nation’s infancy into the late-twentieth century.69 The 
history of reliance on the English rule, as well as how the deference and 
the neutral-principles approaches came to be, reveal what legal concerns 
American courts focused on, as well as the reasons for formulating the 
two doctrines as they stand now.70 Thus, studying the evolution of 
competing jurisprudence on church property disputes provides clarity on 
why and how the First Amendment became central in the 
current jurisprudence. 
 
67. Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. 131, 140 (1872) (invalidating minority faction’s removal of 
church trustees belonging to majority faction to take control of church building) (“In a congregational 
church, the majority . . . represent the church. An expulsion of the majority by a minority is void 
act.”); see also Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 729 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that the Bouldin 
decision rested on “commonsense rules for deciding an intraorganizational dispute: in an organization 
which has provided for majority rule through certain procedures, a minority’s attempt to usurp that 
rule and those procedures need be given no effect by civil courts”). 
68. Md. & Va. Eldership of Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 
370 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (explaining that courts can use the formal title doctrine to 
“study[] deeds, reverter clauses, and general state corporation laws” to resolve religious property 
disputes); see also Maktab Tarighe Oveyssi Shah Maghsoudi, Inc. v. Kianfar, 179 F.3d 1244, 1249 
(9th Cir. 1999) (stating that under the neutral-principles approach, courts can rely on “state statutes 
concerning the holding of religious property, the language in the relevant deeds, and the terms of 
corporate charters of religious organizations” (citing Md. & Va. Eldership, 396 U.S. at 367–68)). 
69. See generally Bouldin, 82 U.S. at 140 (applying the majority rule); Presbyterian Church in U.S. 
v. E. Heights Presbyterian Church, 159 S.E.2d 690, 695 (Ga. 1968) (incorporating elements of the 
departure-from-doctrine test), rev’d, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Baker v. Fales, 16 Mass. 488, 521 (1820) 
(deciding that church property ownership remains with those who remain with the church, even if that 
group constitutes a minority). 
70. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 727–29 (1871) (expressing First Amendment-based concerns 
to explain why English church property dispute jurisprudence is inapplicable in the United States and 
why the deference approach is appropriate); Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 605–06 (rejecting the 
argument that the First Amendment requires a compulsory adherence to the deference approach in all 
church property disputes). 
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II. COMPETING JURISPRUDENCE ON CHURCH PROPERTY 
DISPUTES 
The evolution of American jurisprudence on church property disputes 
begins with English tradition. The lingering English influence dissolved 
when the Supreme Court adopted the deference approach in Watson v. 
Jones. A century later, the Court expressly approved the neutral-principles 
approach. States responded by mostly embracing one over the other.71 
This part reviews all three rules’ genesis and their operation, then 
proceeds to discussing the flaws of the two American doctrines. 
A. The English Jurisprudence 
State courts resolved most early church property disputes based on 
applicable state laws.72 Still, the English legal traditions remained 
influential in many early American courts, which the Supreme Court 
acknowledged in Watson v. Jones.73 The Court dedicated a substantial 
portion of the decision to surveying the development and evolution of the 
English rule as it existed at the time.74 As the Supreme Court wrestled 
over formulating a legally sound principle to govern church property 
disputes in America, an English case, Craigdallie v. Aikman 
(Craigdallie I),75 stood out to the Watson Court. 
The Court found Craigdallie I particularly important for two reasons. 
First, the facts of the case bore in “some points a striking analogy” to the 
many church disputes that state courts faced in the 1800s.76 Second, the 
House of Lords’s decision in Craigdallie I addressed the role of civil 
courts in resolving church property disputes for both congregational and 
hierarchical structured churches.77 This stood out to the Watson Court 
because courts typically applied a different analysis to different church 
structures. For instance, the English courts simply enforced the will of the 
majority to decide internal property disputes for congregational 
 
71. See cases cited supra notes 22–24.  
72. See Osborne & Bush, supra note 12, at 814 (“Prior to Watson, state courts handled church 
property disputes, but previous disputes were local and centered on specific issues of state law.”). 
73. 80 U.S. 679, 705 (1871) (tracing the origin of church property litigations in certain church 
denominations to Scotland and how English doctrine dealt with them, while also noting that American 
courts followed that doctrine).  
74. Id. at 703–711 (explaining the development of English legal principles on how much authority 
civil courts should have in settling religious matters to adjudicate church property disputes).  
75. [1813] 1 Dow 2, 3 Eng. Rep. 601 (HL) (appeal taken from Scotland). 
76. Watson, 80 U.S. at 704.  
77. Id. 
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churches.78 However, applying the same rule became less logical when 
applied to hierarchical churches where conflicts arose between local units 
and general bodies of the same church.79 In 1813, the House of Lords, the 
highest British appellate court for almost all matters,80 finally stepped in 
to settle what rule applied in Craigdallie I. There, John Scott, the Lord 
Chancellor of the House of Lords and the first earl of Eldon,81 laid out the 
basis for the rule later referred to as the departure-from-doctrine test. 
Lord Eldon penned the decision, expressly holding that real property 
with religious purposes constituted a trust that belonged to the members 
of the religious organization that better followed and submitted to the 
organization’s original founding religious principle.82 As the ruling’s 
language suggested, the rule promulgated in Craigdallie v. Aikman 
(Craigdallie II)83 evolved into the departure-from-doctrine test.84 In 
explaining this rule further, Lord Eldon commented on the inevitable need 
of civil courts to evaluate religious matters and determine which of the 
disputing parties better followed the governing religious principles.85 
 
78. Id. (“The earlier decisions, accepting as a conclusive test of right the action of a majority of the 
local congregation, afforded an easy and simple rule, so long as applied to independent 
churches . . . .”).  
79. Id. (“[B]ut when [deferring to the majority will] came to be applied to societies organized as a 
part of larger bodies, where the majorities in the local and general organizations might be different, it 
was found not to be founded on just or practicable principles.”).  
80. House of Lords, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/House-of-
Lords (last visited Feb. 27, 2020) (“A fourth element, the Law Lords . . . acted as Britain’s final court 
of appeal (except for Scottish criminal cases) until 2009 . . . .”).  
81. John Scott, 1st Earl of Eldon, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/ 
biography/John-Scott-1st-Earl-of-Eldon (last visited Feb. 27, 2020). 
82. Craigdallie v. Aikman (Craigdallie II) [1820] 4 Eng. Rep. 435, 435; 2 Bligh 529, 529 (HL) 
(appeal taken from Scotland) (“Held, that in a case where it was difficult to ascertain who were the 
legal owners, as representatives of the contributors, the use of the meeting-house belongs to those 
who adhere to the religious principles of those by whom it was erected; and those who had separated 
themselves from the Associate Synod, and declined their jurisdiction, were held to have forfeited their 
right to the property: although it had been judicially declared that there was no intelligible difference 
of opinion between them and the adherents of the Synod.”). 
83. [1820] 4 Eng. Rep. 435, 435; 2 Bligh 529, 529 (HL) (appeal taken from Scotland); Troy Harris, 
Neutral Principles of the Law and Church Property in the United States, 30 J. CHURCH & ST. 515, 
516–17 (1988) (“Seven years after Craigdallie I was remanded to the Scottish Court of Session, the 
House of Lords heard Craigdallie II, and the opinion was again written by Lord Eldon, who 
summarized his earlier decision [in Craigdallie I] . . . .”). 
84. Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Church Property Disputes: Churches as Secular and Alien Institutions, 55 
FORDHAM L. REV. 335, 338–39 (1986). 
85. Craigdallie II, 4 Eng. Rep. at 439; see also Hassler, supra note 29, at 408 (“[The English rule] 
called on courts, in the absence of express language, to make an investigation into the doctrinal beliefs 
of the disputing parties, and to imply a trust in favor of the party most closely adhering to the beliefs 
held by the donor, effectively giving that faction ownership.”).  
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English courts subsequently followed Lord Eldon’s ruling,86 which 
cemented the departure-from-doctrine test’s legitimacy. In turn, American 
courts had to evaluate its place in the American jurisprudence, ultimately 
rejecting it.87 
B. The American Jurisprudence 
The English influence on how American civil courts resolved church 
property disputes ended when the United States Supreme Court decided 
Watson v. Jones in 1871.88 The decision had a significant consequence, 
signaling that courts should use the deference approach to handle church 
property disputes.89 The Supreme Court caused another shift when it 
decided Jones v. Wolf in 1979, allowing states to use the competing 
neutral-principles of law approach so long as the dispute involved no 
ecclesiastical interpretation.90 Since Jones, states courts have diverged on 
how they adjudicate real property disputes between members or units of 
the same church.91 Most jurisdictions largely prefer one approach over the 
other, and the rest embrace both.92 
1. The Hierarchical Deference Approach 
The hierarchical deference approach enjoys the distinction of being the 
Supreme Court’s first adopted church property jurisprudence. Despite its 
nineteenth century roots, the deference approach remains influential in 
civil courts, especially when deciding property disputes for hierarchical 
 
86. See Att’y-Gen. v. Pearson (1835) 58 Eng. Rep. 848, 855; Foley v. Wontner (1820) 37 Eng. 
Rep. 621. 
87. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 706–07 (1871) (recognizing that the English rule, while simple 
and just, still did not rid of all difficulties of its application and citing cases that support 
that conclusion). 
88. Id. at 727–29. 
89. Id. at 727 (“[W]e think the rule of action which should govern the civil courts, founded in a 
broad and sound view of the relations of church and state under our system of laws . . . is, that, 
whenever the question of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been 
decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal 
tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in their application the case 
before them.”). 
90. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979) (noting the Court’s prior approval of the neutral-
principles approach in Md. & Va. Churches where the dispute involved “no inquiry into 
religious doctrine”). 
91. Hassler, supra note 29, at 416–17 (explaining that states organized themselves into distinct 
groups that apply different doctrines to resolve church property disputes). 
92. Id. at 416–26 (arguing that most states either strictly apply the deference approach or the 
neutral-principles approach, or some combination of both). 
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churches.93 The deference approach expressly prohibited the English 
departure-from-doctrine test on First Amendment grounds.94 This marked 
the first time that the Supreme Court invoked federal constitutional 
principles to limit the role of civil courts in adjudicating church property 
disputes.95 The First Amendment-based justification for the limited role 
of civil courts continues to thrive today, along with the deference 
approach. Consequently, understanding how and why the Supreme Court 
applied the First Amendment to church property disputes requires 
studying the case that started it all—Watson v. Jones. 
Watson centered around a real property dispute between members of 
the Walnut Street Presbyterian Church of Louisville, Kentucky.96 In 1842, 
the Walnut Street Church’s members formally organized the church as a 
member of the Presbyterian Church in the United States.97 Nine years 
later, the local congregation purchased the church lot where the church 
building would soon stand. It also authorized the church’s trustees to 
“hold any real estate then owned by it”98 and “pass[] such regulations 
relative to . . . control of the church property as they might think proper, 
not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States and the laws of 
Kentucky.”99 Under the Presbyterian Church organizational structure, 
church trustees primarily performed secular duties of holding legal title to 
local church property and managing said property on the local 
congregations’ behalf.100 
On the other hand, local congregations vested their ecclesiastical 
leadership in a body called the session, composed of the appointed 
minister and ruling elders of each congregation.101 Additionally, the 
 
93. See, e.g., Heartland Presbytery v. Presbyterian Church of Stanley, Inc., 390 P.3d 581, 594 (Kan. 
Ct. App. 2017) (“Thus, we find that where a dispute over the control of church property arises out of 
a schism within a congregation that is affiliated with a hierarchical denomination and a decision 
regarding the issue has been made by the highest tribunal of that denomination to which the issue has 
been presented, civil courts are to accept the decision of the tribunal as binding.”); cf. Hyung Jin Moon 
v. Hak Ja Han Moon, 431 F. Supp. 3d 394, 406–07 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (summarizing when the deference 
approach applies).  
94. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 729 (1871) (“[W]e do not think the doctrines of the English 
Chancery Court on this subject should have with us the influence which we would cheerfully accord 
to it on others.”).  
95. See, e.g., Nelson v. Brewer, 2019 IL App (1st) 173143, ¶ 57, 138 N.E.3d 220, 233 (“The 
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine is grounded in the [F]irst [A]mendment. It had its genesis in Watson 
v. Jones . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
96. Watson, 80 U.S. at 681. 
97. Id. at 683. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 681. 
101. Id. 
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Presbyterian Church organized itself into ascending levels of hierarchy. 
This structure had local congregations’ sessions at the foundation, 
followed by presbyteries, synods, and finally culminating with the general 
assembly at the apex.102 Under this tiered system, each body supervised 
and exercised varying levels of control over the one below it, with 
sessions’ authority and control limited to its local congregation’s affairs 
only.103 Thus, while each local congregation’s members democratically 
elected their ruling elders, only the presbytery that the local congregation 
belonged to could choose and officially appoint the minister to lead 
the congregation. 
The Supreme Court began its opinion by first taking notice of the 
English departure-from-doctrine test’s significance, explaining how it 
operated and what factors courts looked to under it.104 But the Court found 
the English rule impermissible because it found any attempt from civil 
courts to question or critique church decision on ecclesiastical issues 
problematic.105 Specifically, the Court remarked how the English rule 
oppressed and ran counter to the constitutional right to free religious 
belief.106 The Court explained that “in so far as the fundamental laws of 
the church confer powers on its tribunals, the civil courts will recognize 
them, and where civil rights are involved, will give effect to their exercise 
without inquiring into the motives or grounds of action of the 
ecclesiastical tribunal.”107 The Court emphasized that when ecclesiastical 
questions are present in a property right dispute, the most authoritative 
standard of judgment in deciding which party would own the property 
would be the organizational documents, such as a church constitution.108 
The Supreme Court warned that should courts inquire into and determine 
matters such as doctrinal theology or church customs, such secular 
interpretations would unduly deprive churches of “the right of construing 
their own church laws.”109 
After prohibiting the English method of allowing civil courts’ 
interpretation of ecclesiastical questions,110 the Supreme Court criticized 
 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 705. 
105. Id. at 729 (“It is not to be supposed that the judges of the civil courts can be as competent in 
the ecclesiastical law and religious faith . . . .”). 
106. Id. at 728–29. 
107. Id. at 710. 
108. Id. at 710–11. 
109. Id. at 733. 
110. Id. at 729. 
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the Kentucky State Court of Appeals for doing just that.111 Ultimately, the 
Court found that when the appellant group left the church, they lost their 
right to ownership of the disputed property because the church 
constitution dictated that only those who remain with the church enjoy 
ownership of it.112 
Although Watson was based on federal common law—therefore not 
binding on state courts until the high court incorporated the First 
Amendment to states113—the Court repeatedly affirmed its status as the 
only acceptable doctrine until the 1970s.114 The focus on First 
Amendment principles continued in subsequent cases, where the Court 
declared that “[s]tates, religious organizations, and individuals must 
structure relationships involving church property so as not to require the 
civil courts to resolve ecclesiastical questions.”115 The Court has further 
held that the First Amendment bars courts from disturbing church bodies’ 
decisions on property disputes where the final resolution turns on 
answering religious questions.116 Many states have agreed with the 
Supreme Court’s approval, either adopting or affirming their preference 
for the deference approach even after it became optional in 1979.117 
2. The Neutral-Principles of Law Approach 
Various state courts tried to reject compulsory application of the 
deference approach after Watson.118 In the midst of those efforts, the 
 
111. Id. at 733–34 (listing Kentucky Court of Appeals’s errors).  
112. Id. (“[T]he appellants in the case presented to us have separated themselves wholly from the 
church organization to which they belonged when this controversy commenced. They now deny its 
authority, denounce its action, and refuse to abide by its judgments. . . . [T]he appellants, in their 
present position, have no right to the property, or to the use of it, which is the subject of this suit.”).  
113. Ronald F. Chase, Annotation, Determination of Property Rights Between Local Church and 
Parent Church Body: Modern View, 52 A.L.R.3d 324, § 2(a) n.9 (1973). 
114. See cases cited supra note 18 (listing Supreme Court cases that affirmed the 
deference approach). 
115. Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 
U.S. 440, 449 (1969). For instance, the Court explained that the compulsory deference to church rules 
in settling certain church property disputes followed from the need to protect free exercise of 
religion. Id. 
116. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976).  
117. E.g., Mills v. Baldwin, 362 So. 2d 2, 6–7 (Fla. 1978); Tea v. Protestant Episcopal Church, 610 
P.2d 182, 184 (Nev. 1980); Diocese of Newark v. Burns, 417 A.2d 31, 33–34 (N.J. 1980); Presbytery 
of Cimarron v. Westminster Presbyterian Church of Enid, 515 P.2d 211, 216–17 (Okla. 1973); 
Presbytery of Seattle, Inc. v. Rohrbaugh, 79 Wash. 2d 367, 373, 485 P.2d 615, 619 (1971); Church of 
God of Madison v. Noel, 318 S.E.2d 920, 923–24 (W. Va. 1984); Bennison v. Sharp, 329 N.W.2d 
466, 474 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); Daniel v. Wray, 580 S.E.2d 711, 717 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003). 
118. See Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. E. Heights Presbyterian Church, 159 S.E.2d 690, 696, 700–
01 (Ga. 1968) (using method resembling departure-from-doctrine test), overruled by Mary Elizabeth 
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Supreme Court started to signal its tacit approval of the neutral-principles 
of law approach, 119 under which courts can examine deeds, relationships, 
and relevant contractual documents to resolve church property disputes.120 
Then in 1979, the implicit approval became explicit when the Court 
approved the neutral-principles approach in Jones v. Wolf.121 
Like many of the typical church property disputes, Jones involved a 
local church wishing to keep its church property while attempting to break 
its membership from a larger, national church body. The local church, the 
Vineville Presbyterian Church of Macon, Georgia, organized as a member 
of the Augusta-Macon Presbytery of the Presbyterian Church in the 
United States (PCUS).122 When the majority of the local church’s 
congregation voted to separate from the PCUS, the Augusta-Macon 
Presbytery appointed a commissioner to examine the dispute.123 The 
commissioner eventually determined that the true congregation was the 
faction that voted against the separation and nullified all authority from 
the seceding faction.124 Under that ruling, the minority faction constituted 
the true congregation, and the local church sued to assert ownership over 
the church property.125 However, the Georgia state trial court held for the 
seceding majority, applying the state’s neutral-principles of law 
approach.126 The Georgia State Supreme Court affirmed, and the minority 
faction appealed to the federal Supreme Court.127 
Before reaching the case’s merits, the Court recognized Georgia’s 
 
Blue Hull, 393 U.S. 440; Md. & Va. Eldership of Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, 
Inc., 254 A.2d 162, 166–67 (Md. 1969) (adjudicating church property dispute through reference to 
relevant state laws on religious corporations and express language in disputed properties’ deeds), 
appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970) (per curiam); cf. St. John Chrysostom Greek Cath. Church 
v. Elko, 259 A.2d 419, 427 (Pa. 1969) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (citing Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas 
Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 119 (1952) (arguing civil courts should use the 
neutral-principles approach, which is free of favoritism towards any particular church organization)). 
119. See, e.g., Md. & Va. Eldership, 396 U.S. at 368 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[A] State may 
adopt any one of various approaches for settling church property disputes so long as it involves no 
consideration of doctrinal matters . . . .” (emphasis in original)).  
120. Id.; Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull, 393 U.S. at 449 (“It is obvious . . . that not every civil court 
decision as to property claimed by a religious organization jeopardizes values protected by the First 
Amendment . . . . [T]here are neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes, 
which can be applied without ‘establishing’ churches to which property is awarded.”). 
121. 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979) (“We therefore hold that a State is constitutionally entitled to adopt 
neutral principles of law as a means of adjudicating a church property dispute.”). 
122. Id. at 597. 
123. Id. at 598. 
124. Id.  
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 599. 
127. Id. 
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adoption of the neutral-principles of law approach.128 The Court explained 
that the approach’s basic operations required courts to “examine[] the 
deeds to the properties, the state statutes dealing with implied 
trusts[,] . . . and the Book of Church Order to determine whether there was 
any basis for a trust in favor of the general church.”129 After explaining 
the basics of the neutral-principles of law approach, the Court elucidated 
why the First Amendment did not require compulsory adherence to the 
deference approach. First, the Court acknowledged that the First 
Amendment commanded civil courts to respect decisions regarding 
religious doctrine or polity from the highest church body of hierarchical 
churches.130 However, the Court immediately narrowed the First 
Amendment’s reach by stating that “the First Amendment does not dictate 
that a State must follow a particular method of resolving church property 
disputes.”131 The Court then listed the approach’s two main strengths: 
(1) its secular operation because it relied on “objective, well-established 
concepts of trust and property law”;132 and (2) its shared genius of 
“private-law systems in general—flexibility in ordering private rights and 
obligations to reflect the intentions of the parties.”133 In the Court’s view, 
the neutral-principles of law approach would effectuate the church 
members’ intent to settle any and all internal disputes.134 
Rejecting the dissent’s insistence on strictly enforcing the deference 
approach,135 the Jones majority explained that it “[could not] 
agree . . . that the First Amendment requires the States to adopt a rule of 
compulsory deference to religious authority in resolving church property 
disputes, even where no issue of doctrinal controversy is involved.”136 The 
 
128. Id. at 600. 
129. Id. (citation omitted). The Court also noticed the Georgia State Supreme Court’s use of the 
neutral-principles of law approach in another state case, again noting that there the state court looked 
to the “deeds, the corporate charter, [and] the state statutes dealing with implied trusts.” Id. (citing 
Carnes v. Smith, 222 S.E.2d 322 (Ga. 1976)). 
130. Id. at 602. 
131. Id.  
132. Id. at 603.  
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 603–04 (“Through appropriate reversionary clauses and trust provisions, religious 
societies can specify what is to happen to church property in the event of a particular contingency, or 
what religious body will determine the ownership in the event of a schism or doctrinal controversy. 
In this manner, a religious organization can ensure that a dispute over the ownership of church 
property will be resolved in accord with the desires of the members.”). 
135. Id. at 604–05 (“The dissent would require the States to abandon the neutral-principles method, 
and instead would insist as a matter of constitutional law that whenever a dispute arises over the 
ownership of church property, civil courts must defer to the ‘authoritative resolution of the dispute 
within the church itself.’”). 
136. Id. at 605. 
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majority further defended the neutral-principles approach’s 
constitutionality by countering the dissent’s suggestion that the approach 
would infringe on people’s free exercise rights.137 
The long-winded road that the Supreme Court took to expressly 
endorse the neutral-principles of law approach’s validity to resolve church 
property disputes exemplifies the complex and oft-confusing ways that 
courts handle such disputes. The Jones opinion only exacerbated that 
problem by refusing to put forth a uniform doctrine. The Court, in 
allowing states to depart from the deference approach, ironically 
confirmed that states are also free to stick with the deference approach. 
This freedom allowed some states, including Washington, to use both. 
The Jones decision created a remarkable opportunity for other 
jurisdictions to depart from Watson’s compulsory mandate and use the 
deference approach. Jones empowered states to embrace the 
neutral-principles approach, which became the majority approach in the 
United States.138 The Court’s refusal to endorse a single approach also led 
some states to adopt the hybrid approach,139 which usually gives trial 
courts wide discretion in what approach they decide to employ.140 Lastly, 
some jurisdictions still have yet to firmly settle on their preferred method 
of resolving church property disputes.141 
Many scholars have raised concerns regarding church property 
jurisprudence, including the hybrid approach.142 But the more serious 
problem lurking in the background is the flawed legal basis that the two 
approaches rest on. Specifically, justifying either the deference or the 
 
137. Id. at 606 (“The neutral-principles approach cannot be said to ‘inhibit’ the free exercise of 
religion, any more than do other neutral provisions of state law governing the manner in which 
churches own property, hire employees, or purchase goods . . . . At any time before the dispute erupts, 
the parties can ensure, if they so desire, that the faction loyal to the hierarchical church will retain the 
church property . . . . And the civil courts will be bound to give effect to the result indicated by the 
parties, provided it is embodied in some legally cognizable form.”). 
138. See cases cited supra note 23 (list of states that use the neutral-principles approach). 
139. See cases cited supra note 24 (list of states that use the hybrid approach). 
140. In re Episcopal Church Cases, 198 P.3d 66, 78 (Cal. 2009) (explaining that the two approaches 
are not mutually exclusive); Episcopal Diocese of Fort Worth v. Episcopal Church, 422 S.W.3d 646, 
651 (Tex. 2013) (explaining that both approaches are permissible). 
141. See Hassler, supra note 29, at 457–63 (classifying Kansas, Nebraska, New Mexico, North 
Dakota, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming as states that have yet to decide on 
which approach to use). 
142. See, e.g., 1 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 286 (2009) (discussing 
“three serious defects” in the deference approach); Mark Strasser, When Churches Divide: On 
Neutrality, Deference, and Unpredictability, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 427, 454–66 (2009) (discussing 
problems of the neutral-principles approach); Michael W. McConnell & Luke W. Goodrich, On 
Resolving Church Property Disputes, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 307, 340 (2016) (arguing that “[t]he hybrid 
approach also creates significant uncertainty about property rights, harming both churches and 
third parties”). 
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neutral-principles approach on First Amendment grounds has run its 
course: neither approach can constitutionally conform to First 
Amendment values. 
C. Flaws of the Deference and the Neutral-Principles Approaches 
Courts historically have validated the deference and the 
neutral-principles approaches on First Amendment grounds. Ironically, 
both approaches fail to respect the First Amendment’s religion clauses. 
Courts and scholars alike have questioned the validity of both approaches 
because of that failure.143 This Part examines each approach’s flaws in 
closer detail to highlight why the First Amendment is ultimately an 
unworkable rationale for church property disputes. 
1. The Deference Approach’s Flaws 
Under the deference approach, the reviewing civil courts assess 
whether the parties in dispute belong to a hierarchical church. To 
accomplish this, courts look to the parties’ relationship with each other 
and with the general church, church governing documents, and even 
norms, customs, and history of the church.144 Additionally, courts assess 
whether the underlying dispute stems from intraorganizational 
disagreement over some religious matters. These matters can include 
theological beliefs, appointment or removal of certain church officials, or 
even decisions to split from a church based on a doctrinal schism.145 If a 
court finds either hierarchical church structure or religious nature of the 
underlying issue, the court will review: (1) whether a supervising body 
within the church has ruled on ownership of the property in question and 
(2) if it has, whether it based the decision on religious matters (e.g., 
whether one party better conformed to the church’s beliefs).146 If so, the 
civil court will enforce the church supervising body’s determination on 
property ownership.147 
 
143. See infra section II.C.1. 
144. See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 716–
17 (1976) (referring to the general church’s written constitution to confirm which church organ has 
the final authority on religious matters); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 683 (1871) (examining the 
relationship between disputing parties and tracing the church’s history). 
145. See, e.g., Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 698–705 (noting the underlying dispute that triggered the 
property dispute).   
146. Id. at 721–23 (noting the religious nature of the underlying dispute and affirming that since 
the property dispute hinged on religious affairs, civil courts are bound to follow the general 
church’s decision).  
147. Id. at 724–25 (stating hierarchical churches can enforce their own rules for internal discipline 
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The most powerful and popular reason for supporting the deference 
approach is that it avoids secular entanglement in religious affairs.148 
Scholars who strongly sympathize with freedom of religious practices 
often stress the importance of religious autonomy when discussing 
religion’s role in the United States.149 But regardless of how much 
religious organizations want to be free from external intrusion, the 
Supreme Court has long recognized governmental authority over some 
religious affairs.150 
Secular government involvement is necessary because of the legitimate 
governmental interest in resolving property disputes of all kinds, 
including church property disputes.151 The deference approach is usually 
reserved for hierarchically structured church organizations.152 But 
applying the deference approach requires civil courts to factually 
conclude whether the disputing parties are members of a hierarchical or 
congregational church. Such a conclusion necessarily involves secular 
analysis and interpretation of the structure or polity of the disputing 
parties—an indisputable secular entanglement into a purely religious 
matter.153 The consequence of deciding the church polity type weakens 
 
and government, and that if such rules are applied to direct their subordinate bodies, civil courts must 
accept them as binding decisions). 
148. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 618 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“[T]he civil court must focus 
directly on ascertaining, and then following, the decision made within the structure of church 
governance. By doing so . . . it refrains from direct review and revision of decisions of the church on 
matters of religious doctrine and practice . . . . [and] the civil court avoids interfering indirectly with 
the religious governance . . . .”); see also Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in 
Conflicts over Religious Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1851 (1998) (“If civil courts were to 
deny church property to a body that would otherwise control it because the body has been guilty of a 
‘departure from doctrine,’ civil courts would address matters for which they are woefully ill-suited, 
and the legal rule would frustrate changes in religious understandings.”); Nathan Clay Belzer, 
Deference in the Judicial Resolution of Intrachurch Disputes: The Lesser of Two Constitutional Evils, 
11 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 109, 139 (1998) (“[W]hile deference may encounter several religion clause 
problems of its own, it remains the preferable approach: the lesser of two constitutional evils.”). 
149. See Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Group Autonomy: Further Reflections About What Is at 
Stake, 22 J.L. & RELIGION 153 (2006); Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural 
Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1998); Frederick Mark Gedicks, Toward a 
Constitutional Doctrine of Religious Group Rights, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 99.  
150. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (“Laws are made for the government 
of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may 
with practices.”).  
151. Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 
U.S. 440, 445 (1969) (“It is of course true that the State has a legitimate interest in resolving property 
disputes, and that a civil court is a proper forum for that resolution.”). 
152. Ashley Alderman, Note, Where’s the Wall?: Church Property Disputes Within the Civil 
Courts and the Need for Consistent Application of the Law, 39 GA. L. REV. 1027, 1039–40 (2005).  
153. GREENAWALT, supra note 142, at 275 (“[T]he [deference] approach . . . does require an initial 
decision about the nature of a church’s government.”); id. at 276–77 (“The more courts attempt to 
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the supposed benefit of the deference approach: preventing secular 
interference in religious affairs.154 
Civil courts cannot determine how a church is structured without 
reviewing church governance documents, understandings between the 
disputing parties, and perhaps even looking into religious norms and 
customs of the church. The gravest issue with this involvement is that such 
reviews may infringe on the “free exercise” of religion. This concern may 
not be readily apparent, given that church units or members voluntarily 
submit to civil courts’ authority to adjudicate their property disputes. 
However, the problem is not that the deference approach relies on civil 
courts to resolve church property disputes. Instead, the problem lies with 
civil courts interpreting what the church polity is, which an essentially 
religious matter. Because the deference approach requires courts to 
determine the church polity is, the approach inevitably forces courts to 
violate the First Amendment. 
Another flaw with the deference approach is the weight that civil courts 
give to church bodies’ decisions on matters that are inherently secular. 
Even if church property disputes originate from an internal ecclesiastical 
disagreement, courts cannot adjudicate them without consulting secular 
constitutions,155 statutes,156 and common law.157 Yet, the deference 
approach demands civil courts to submit to the authorities of church 
bodies and accept their decisions as conclusive when concerning church 
property ownership.158 Further exacerbating the problem is that while 
courts summarily accept the findings from the highest body in a 
hierarchical church, they do not afford the same level of deference to 
 
refine distinctions, asking whether hierarchical bodies have authority over particular subjects, the 
more their classifications in individual cases may turn on disputable ecclesiastical matters.”). 
154. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979) (“The dissent suggests that a rule of 
compulsory deference would somehow involve less entanglement of civil courts in matters of 
religious doctrine, practice, and administration. Under its approach, however, civil courts would 
always be required to examine the polity and administration of a church to determine which unit of 
government has ultimate control over church property . . . . But in [some cases], the locus of control 
would be ambiguous . . . . In such cases, the suggested rule would appear to require ‘a searching and 
therefore impermissible inquiry into church polity.’” (citation omitted)). 
155. E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I (prohibiting the federal government from establishing religion or 
infringing on people’s right to freely exercise their religious beliefs); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4 
(prohibiting the state from establishing religion and guaranteeing free exercise). 
156. E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 65.042 (2019) (affirming that religious doctrine or practice will 
supersede state laws to the extent required by the federal or state Constitution, or both). 
157. E.g., Mt. Olive Afr. Methodist Episcopal Church of Fruitland, Inc. v. Bd. of Incorporators of 
Afr. Methodist Episcopal Church Inc., 703 A.2d 194, 200–04 (Md. 1997) (interpreting relevant 
statutes and precedents to determine the disputed property’s ownership). 
158. Belzer, supra note 148, at 122 (“Deference to church authorities entails the adoption by the 
courts of the decisions of either congregational majorities or the highest governing body in a 
hierarchical church.”).  
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congregational churches.159 The greater deference accorded to decisions 
from hierarchical churches may amount to a tacit governmental 
preference for hierarchical churches.160 This seemingly preferential 
treatment towards one type of church structure over another raises a valid 
concern about whether the judiciary follows the Establishment Clause’s 
command that the government be neutral towards all religious groups.161 
2. The Neutral-Principles Approach’s Flaws 
The neutral-principles approach affords no deference to any church 
decision on property ownership. This is because the neutral-principles 
approach only applies to property disputes that do not originate from 
intraorganizational disagreement over some religious matters. Thus, the 
neutral-principles approach allows civil courts wider latitude in 
determining property ownership. Courts using this approach primarily 
examine the deed or title of the property in question, but also refer to 
church governing documents. 
The Supreme Court and some state courts regard the neutral-principles 
approach as having the advantage of being secular in operation but 
sufficiently flexible to accommodate all forms of religious organization 
and polity.162 However, it is not flawless. The neutral-principles approach 
requires civil courts to examine all relevant documents and events 
regarding the disputed church property. In doing so, courts can interpret 
religious governing rules and documents through a secular lens. Secular 
interpretations of religious matters can and do distort a church’s intent on 
how it wants to organize or what powers it vests to each of its unit. Hence, 
civil courts sometimes fail to respect the provisions that church members 
 
159. GREENAWALT, supra note 142, at 271 (“[The] difference between the degree of procedural 
protection courts afford members of congregational churches and hierarchical ones favors 
institutional authorities of hierarchical bodies over their members who may rely on procedures found 
in their governing documents.”). 
160. Id. at 275 (“Another conceivable reason for favoring the general church as much as the 
deference approach does is to promote unity or centralized government.”); see also Michael William 
Galligan, Note, Judicial Resolution of Intrachurch Disputes, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 2007, 2020 (1983) 
(“Judicial decisions to defer to one authority . . . place a governmental stamp of approval on those 
authorities in a manner that violates the establishment clause.”).  
161. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1968) (“Government in our democracy, state and 
national, must be neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice. . . . The First 
Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion 
and nonreligion.” (citing relevant precedents addressing the same issue)). 
162. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979) (“The primary advantages of the neutral-
principles approach are that it is completely secular in operation, and yet flexible enough to 
accommodate all forms of religious organization and polity.”); Hope Presbyterian Church of Rogue 
River v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 291 P.3d 711, 720 (Or. 2012) (“We agree that the neutral 
principles approach has advantages over the hierarchical deference approach . . . .”). 
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or units voluntarily and mutually agreed to. A California court of appeals 
case exemplifies how severe this problem can become. 
In Barr v. United Methodist Church,163 residents of a California 
retirement home sued the home’s corporation and its parent church for 
fraud and breach of contract.164 The court of appeals relied on 
neutral-principles of law to overturn the trial court’s finding that the 
church did not represent a jural165 body that could be held liable for acts 
committed by its agents.166 The appellate court determined that the 
church’s Council of Bishops essentially functioned as the church’s board 
of directors and had the capacity to represent the church and its agents as 
a secular corporation’s board would in similar situations.167 However, the 
church constitution did not assign such a function or authority to the 
Council, nor did it recognize the Council as the church’s highest 
legislative or adjudicatory body.168 Rather, the church structure assigned 
different functions to a variety of bodies and agencies.169 Despite 
assigning previously unavailable powers to the Council of Bishops under 
the existing church constitution, the court of appeals saw no evidence to 
believe that its decision “would affect the distribution of power or 
property within the denomination.”170 Essentially, the appellate court 
ignored the church constitution’s mandates to impose its view on how the 
church operated. 
Barr spotlights the danger of allowing civil courts to draw analogies 
from secular contexts and indiscriminately apply the analogies to settle 
religious matters. Even though Barr involved a commercial dispute, the 
court reached its ruling only after extensively discussing and interpreting 
the church polity. Allowing such practice to continue under the 
neutral-principles approach directly contradicts a supposed benefit of that 
approach, because it can easily frustrate the intent and desire of 
hierarchical church organizations and their members—who voluntarily 
 
163. 153 Cal. Rptr. 322 (Ct. App. 1979).  
164. Id. at 325. 
165. “1. Of, relating to, or involving law or jurisprudence; legal . . . 2. Of, relating to, or involving 
rights and obligations . . . .” Jural, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see also Gen. Conf. 
Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, 617 F.3d 402, 414 (6th Cir. 2010) (affirming that religion 
is not a jural entity capable of being sued).  
166. Barr, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 328, 330, 332.  
167. Id. at 329.  
168. Id.  
169. Id. at 328–29 (recognizing different church agencies charged with different powers); see also 
William Johnson Everett, Ecclesial Freedom and Federal Order: Reflections on the Pacific Homes 
Case, 12 J.L. & RELIGION 371, 379 (1995) (noting the same). 
170. Barr, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 332. 
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agreed to a certain governing structure.171 Thus, the neutral-principles 
approach runs into the similar problem as the deference approach in that 
it fails to keep the government from interfering with the religious affairs 
of church administration. 
The common problem for both approaches, based on their failure to 
constitutionally conform to the First Amendment’s religious clauses, is 
their foundation. Because both are meant to resolve secular matters that 
require interpretations of religious matters, resting the two approaches on 
the First Amendment makes them vulnerable to criticisms. There may be 
many solutions to address this issue, such as amending the First 
Amendment to allow certain secular interpretations of religious affairs. 
But the easier and more natural solution is to look to contract and property 
law principles to justify the two approaches. Specifically, Washington 
State should mirror how it resolves property disputes between secular, 
voluntarily associated organizations when adjudicating church 
property disputes. 
III. WASHINGTON STATE’S APPROACH TO RESOLVING 
PROPERTY DISPUTES 
Washington State courts have resolved numerous civil litigations 
involving disputes between members or units of the same church, 
including disputes over church properties. Washington State courts use 
both the deference and neutral-principles approaches. However, both 
methods share similarities to how courts resolve secular property disputes, 
particularly those involving voluntarily-associated nonprofit or fraternal 
organizations. This Part examines the history of church and non-church 
property disputes in Washington State. It emphasizes that because the 
adjudication methods involved in both disputes are so similar, using legal 
doctrines unrelated to the First Amendment is possible and sensible to 
adjudicate church property disputes. 
A. Church Property Disputes 
Washington State applies the deference approach when resolving 
church property disputes from hierarchical churches.172 Indeed, the 
 
171. See GREENAWALT, supra note 142, at 278 (“[N]eutral principles afford religious groups more 
ability to carry out their exact intentions than the extreme deference of the polity approach . . . .”); see 
also McConnell & Goodrich, supra note 142, at 334 (“A common criticism of the strict 
[neutral-principles] approach is that it is not as good as the hybrid [of deference and neutral-principles] 
approach at ascertaining the parties’ intent.”). 
172. See Presbytery of Seattle, Inc. v. Rohrbaugh, 79 Wash. 2d 367, 485 P.2d 615 (1971); Hoffman 
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Washington State Court of Appeals recently clarified that the deference 
approach still remains the binding doctrine.173 Surveying prior decisions 
offers helpful insight into what Washington State courts have found 
relevant when adjudicating church property disputes. 
The Washington State constitution’s article I, section 11 discusses the 
religious rights of its residents.174 It adopted the federal religion clause’s 
core ideas of guaranteeing free exercise of religious beliefs and 
prohibiting governmental establishment of religion.175 Concerning church 
property, the Washington State Supreme Court has interpreted the 
article I, section 11 to allow greater discretion to religious organizations 
to manage their real properties.176 But greater discretion does not mean 
absolute discretion, as Washington State courts recognize instances where 
churches must give way to legitimate secular regulations of their real 
property.177 Nonetheless, Washington State courts have consistently 
declined to settle internal church affairs if some ecclesiastical elements 
 
v. Tieton View Cmty. Methodist Episcopal Church, 33 Wash. 2d 716, 207 P.2d 699 (1949); Wilkeson 
v. Rector of St. Luke’s Par. of Tacoma, 176 Wash. 377, 29 P.2d 748 (1934); Hendryx v. People’s 
United Church of Spokane, 42 Wash. 336, 84 P. 1123 (1906); Herman v. Plummer, 20 Wash. 363, 55 
P. 315 (1898); see also Choi v. Sung, 154 Wash. App. 303, 317, 225 P.3d 425, 433 (2010) (affirming 
the decision below that found the church as hierarchical and holding that deference approach applied); 
Southside Tabernacle v. Pentecostal Church of God, Pac. Nw. Dist., Inc., 32 Wash. App. 814, 825–
26, 650 P.2d 231, 237 (1982) (holding that under the deference approach, trial courts should limit 
their inquiry to whether the local church is subject to some higher central authority); cf. Church of 
Christ at Centerville v. Carder, 105 Wash. 2d 204, 208, 713 P.2d 101, 104 (1986) (recognizing that 
for hierarchical churches, deference to the highest hierarchical church body’s decision is proper).  
173. See Presbytery of Seattle v. Schulz, 10 Wash. App. 2d 696, 708, 449 P.3d 1077, 1084 (2019) 
(“Because our Supreme Court decided Rohrbaugh, it is binding on this court . . . .”). 
174. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11.  
175. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”), with WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11 (“Absolute 
freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment, belief and worship, shall be guaranteed 
to every individual, and no one shall be molested or disturbed in person or property on account of 
religion . . . . No public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious 
worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment. . . .”). 
176. See, e.g., First United Methodist Church of Seattle v. Hearing Exam’r for Seattle Landmarks 
Pres. Bd., 129 Wash. 2d 238, 252–53, 916 P.2d 374, 381 (1996) (holding that preventing sale of 
church property by designating it as a landmark violated the church’s right to free exercise of 
religion); First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d 203, 230, 840 P.2d 174, 
189 (1992) (finding city regulation that prevented church from modifying its building exterior through 
landmark designation violated the free exercise right); City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church of 
Sumner, 97 Wash. 2d 1, 10, 639 P.2d 1358, 1363 (1982) (instructing that courts are to balance 
governmental interest in enforcing building code and zoning ordinance with religious organizations’ 
right to free exercise). 
177. See, e.g., Open Door Baptist Church v. Clark Cnty., 140 Wash. 2d 143, 168–70, 995 P.2d 33, 
46–47 (2000) (finding that county ordinance can require churches to apply for conditional use permits 
without impermissibly burdening free right to exercise); N. Pac. Union Conf. Ass’n of the 
Seventh-Day Adventists v. Clark Cnty., 118 Wash. App. 22, 33, 74 P.3d 140, 146 (2003) (holding 
that government can require churches to comply with zoning ordinances). 
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are present.178 The aversion to inserting too much secular influence when 
settling internal church matters also controlled how the Washington State 
Supreme Court adjudicated church property disputes that arose from 
internal religious disagreements.179 
Prominent cases of church property disputes from the late 1800s to 
mid-1900s exemplify Washington State’s gradual shift to preferring the 
deference approach. Herman v. Plummer,180 decided only nine years after 
the state’s formation,181 is the first Washington State Supreme Court 
decision on church property disputes. Decided less than thirty-years after 
Watson v. Jones, Herman notably adopted the deference approach without 
relying on any constitutional values. It embraced the deference approach’s 
fundamental logic that civil courts will enforce existing internal 
adjudicatory procedures and decisions where possible.182 Additionally, it 
advanced ordinary voluntary-association legal principles to support their 
decisions.183 Thus, the Washington State Supreme Court focused on the 
disputing parties’ relationship with each other and what internal 
procedures required them to do, rather than laboring over the proper role 
of the judiciary in resolving church property disputes like its 
federal counterpart. 
The Washington State Supreme Court later broke away from Herman’s 
agnostic attitude towards the judiciary’s proper role.184 The Court 
 
178. Erdman v. Chapel Hill Presbyterian Church, 175 Wash. 2d 659, 683, 286 P.3d 357, 371 (2012) 
(finding church body’s decision on claims of negligent retention and supervision of pastor binding on 
civil courts); e.g., Elvig v. Ackles, 123 Wash. App. 491, 499, 98 P.3d 524, 528 (2004) (holding that 
while civil courts can resolve hierarchical church members’ wrongdoings, courts should defer to 
church tribunals decisions on the matter). 
179. Presbytery of Seattle, Inc. v. Rohrbaugh, 79 Wash. 2d 367, 373, 485 P.2d 615, 619 (1971) 
(“[I]n the absence of fraud, where a right of property in an action before a civil court depends upon a 
question of doctrine, ecclesiastical law, rule or custom, or church government, and the question has 
been decided by the highest tribunal within the organization to which it has been carried, the civil 
court will accept that decision as conclusive.” (citing precedents that held similarly)). 
180. 20 Wash. 363, 55 P. 315 (1898). 
181. Statehood, WASH. STATE LEGISLATURE, https://apps.leg.wa.gov/oralhistory/ 
timeline_event.aspx?e=8 [https://perma.cc/8JA8-RAF5]. 
182. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 729 (1871) (“It is of the essence of these religious unions, 
and of their right to establish tribunals for the decision of questions arising among themselves, that 
those decisions should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to such 
appeals as the organism itself provides for.”); Herman, 20 Wash. at 367, 55 P. at 316 (“[I]t is a 
well-established principle . . . that until the members have exhausted their remedy within the society 
the courts will not assume jurisdiction of the controversy.” (citing to cases supporting 
this proposition)). 
183. Watson, 80 U.S. at 728–29 (“The right to organize voluntary religious associations to assist in 
the expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine . . . is unquestioned.”); Herman, 20 Wash. 
at 367–68, 55 P. at 316 (finding that parties had to resort to resolution under their national 
organization’s bylaws). 
184. Wilkeson v. Rector of St. Luke’s Par. of Tacoma, 176 Wash. 377, 29 P.2d 748 (1934). 
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expressly affirmed the compulsory deference to church decisions when a 
property right is dependent on ecclesiastical matters.185 The Court took 
note of two principles it thought relevant for the dispute, namely the 
deference due to church decisions on matters involving religious issues 
and the majority-control rule when deciding church affairs.186 These two 
principles provide the foundation of the deference approach and the 
neutral-principles approach, respectively. 
The Court continued to apply a hybrid approach on elements from both 
the deference approach and the neutral-principles approach.187 
Specifically, it focused on “whether the Methodist Church, through its 
representatives, was authorized to terminate the lease and cause an 
abandonment thereof.”188 The Court first determined that the church 
defendant belonged to a hierarchical church.189 The Court then examined 
relevant documents of the Methodist Church, mainly its articles 
of incorporation.190 
In Presbytery of Seattle, Inc. v. Rohrbaugh,191 the Laurelhurst United 
Presbyterian Church of Seattle, a member of the United Presbyterian 
Church (UPC), voted to disassociate from UPC after UPC adopted a 
doctrinal change in the church constitution.192 UPC denied Laurelhurst’s 
requests to disassociate from UPC and to still use the church property.193 
UPC then dissolved the chapter altogether.194 Rather than following the 
appeal procedure set out in the UPC constitution, the Seattle-chapter 
members refused to comply with UPC’s order.195 This refusal prompted 
the Presbytery of Seattle, which served as the intermediate supervising 
body for the local chapter, to sue to regain control of the 
church property.196 
On appeal from the trial court’s ruling for the Presbytery, Rohrbaugh 
and the other appellants argued that they comprised the church and that 
 
185. Id. at 384–85, 29 P.2d at 751.  
186. Id. at 385, 29 P.2d at 751. 
187. Hoffman v. Tieton View Cmty. Methodist Episcopal Church, 33 Wash. 2d 716, 207 P.2d 
699 (1949).  
188. Id. at 727, 207 P.2d at 705. 
189. Id. at 729, 207 P.2d at 706 (citing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871)). 
190. Id. at 730, 207 P.2d at 706–07. 
191. 79 Wash. 2d 367, 485 P.2d 615 (1971). 
192. Id. at 368, 485 P.2d at 616–17. 
193. Id. at 368, 485 P.2d at 617. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. 
196. Id. at 368–69, 485 P.2d at 617. 
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the local church was the true record titleholder to the church property.197 
To make this argument, the appellants relied on a case with similar 
facts,198 in which the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed using the 
departure-from-doctrine test to resolve the dispute.199 However, the 
Washington State Supreme Court found the Georgia case unpersuasive, 
noting that the federal Supreme Court had reversed the Georgia Supreme 
Court.200 The Court also stated that, regardless of the Georgia Supreme 
Court’s rationale, Washington had consistently adhered to the principle 
that “in the absence of fraud, where a right of property . . . depends upon 
a question of doctrine . . . or church government, and the question has 
been decided by the highest tribunal within the organization . . . the civil 
court will accept that decision as conclusive.”201 The Court concluded that 
the record title belonged to the UPC, and that the appellants had no right 
to unilaterally withdraw their membership and take possession of the 
church property without going through the internal appeal 
procedure first.202 
The four cases reveal the major concerns that the Washington State 
Supreme Court grappled with as it adjudicated church property disputes 
over the years. Rohrbaugh’s recency and controlling precedential value 
may suggest that the Washington State Supreme Court is tracking the 
Watson Court’s First Amendment-based logic. Yet, Herman, Wilkeson, 
and Hoffman—which have not been overruled—caution against 
disregarding Washington State courts’ ability to apply non-First 
Amendment based analysis for church property disputes. This may be 
especially true considering the similarities between how Washington State 
courts adjudicate church property disputes and non-church 
property disputes. 
B. Non-Church Property Disputes 
Rohrbaugh’s deference to church decisions starkly contrasts how 
courts handle similar issues that come from secular voluntary associations 
or societies.203 In Grand Aerie, Fraternal Order of Eagles v. National 
 
197. Id. at 369, 485 P.2d at 617. 
198. Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. E. Heights Presbyterian Church, 167 S.E.2d 658 (Ga. 1969). 
199. Rohrbaugh, 79 Wash. 2d at 369, 485 P.2d at 618. 
200. Id. at 369–70, 485 P.2d at 617–18. 
201. Id. at 373, 485 P.2d at 619. 
202. Id. at 373, 485 P.2d at 619–20. 
203. GREENAWALT, supra note 142, at 273 (2006) (“For both hierarchical and congregational 
churches, the polity approach differs from how secular associations are treated, in that courts will not 
say when a shift in dominant understanding of purpose has become too great. And the absolute 
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Bank of Washington,204 the Washington State Supreme Court reaffirmed 
that civil courts must refrain from challenging fraternal organizations’ 
decisions regarding membership unless some procedural validity becomes 
questionable.205 The Court also held that “even though the property be 
held in the name of the corporation of the subordinate lodge, upon 
suspension or revocation the property becomes that of the [national 
organization], if the constitution so provides.”206 In another case, the 
Court held that no local member of a voluntary association can use 
property that the association accumulated over its operation for “other 
uses than the uses defined in the constitution and laws of the order.”207 
The court of appeals has added that members of a voluntary association 
“have no severable rights in the property—merely the right to joint use so 
long as they remain members.”208 
Relatedly, Washington State courts have a history of respecting 
voluntary associations’ decisions on how they will govern and be 
governed. In State ex rel. Butterworth v. Frater,209 the Court explained 
that subsidiary members of a national voluntary organization are 
“governed by the agreement which they entered into when joining the 
organization. Courts will not interfere in disputes of this nature, where the 
organization amply provides for their determination.”210 The Court has 
also affirmed that courts should not regulate voluntary organizations’ 
internal affairs.211 Likewise, lower Washington State courts have found 
 
deference courts afford to the highest judicatories of hierarchical religions is unparalleled for secular 
groups.” (emphasis in original)); see also Sirico, supra note 84, at 351 (arguing that the deference 
approach gives churches extreme autonomy that make them “more immune from judicial review than 
any other organization in American society”). 
204. 13 Wash. 2d 131, 124 P.2d 203 (1942). 
205. Id. at 135, 124 P.2d at 205 (“[E]xpulsion of a member from a mutual benefit association would 
not be inquired into by the courts, except to ascertain whether the proceedings were regular, in good 
faith, and not in violation of the laws of the order or the laws of the state.” (citing Kelly v. Grand 
Circle Women of Woodcraft, 40 Wash. 691, 695, 82 P. 1007, 1008 (1905))).  
206. Id. at 137, 124 P.2d at 205.  
207. Grand Ct. of Wash., Foresters of Am. v. Hodel, 74 Wash. 314, 317, 133 P. 438, 439 (1913). 
208. Nat’l Grange of Ord. of Patrons of Husbandry v. O’Sullivan Grange No. 1136, 35 Wash. App. 
444, 452, 667 P.2d 1105, 1110 (1983). 
209. 130 Wash. 501, 228 P. 295 (1924). 
210. Id. at 506, 228 P. at 296. 
211. Wash. Local Lodge No. 104 of Int’l Brotherhood of Boilermakers v. Int’l Brotherhood of 
Boilermakers, 33 Wash. 2d 1, 74, 203 P.2d 1019, 1061 (1949) (“[I]t is not within the province of the 
courts to regulate the internal affairs of . . . voluntary organizations . . . .”); see also Couie v. Local 
Union No. 1849 United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 51 Wash. 2d 108, 115, 316 P.2d 
473, 478 (1957) (“[I]t is not for the jury to interpret the constitution of the union, nor will the courts 
interfere with the interpretation placed upon such a constitution by its officers and agents unless such 
interpretation is arbitrary and unreasonable.”); Anderson v. Enter. Lodge No. 2, 80 Wash. App. 41, 
46, 906 P.2d 962, 966 (1995). 
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the constitution or bylaws of national body of a voluntary association to 
be binding on its subordinate units.212 
Washington State courts have long recognized the authority of higher 
or supervising bodies within the same voluntarily associated organization 
and enforced the organization’s rules of governance, including how 
property ownership should get decided. Thus, the Washington State 
jurisprudence on dispute resolution involving secular voluntary 
organizations has clear similarities to both the deference and the 
neutral-principles approaches. The similarities provide proper 
justification for replacing the First Amendment bases in church property 
jurisprudence with the principles controlling property disputes between 
voluntarily associated organizations. 
IV. REPLACING THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S ROLE IN CHURCH 
PROPERTY DISPUTES 
The current jurisprudence requires an update because it fails to serve 
its purpose of conforming with the First Amendment’s two religion 
clauses. Neither the deference nor the neutral-principles approach can 
perfectly serve the First Amendment value of religious autonomy because 
civil courts must be involved in settling church property disputes. An 
alternative, such as completely removing civil courts’ role in church 
property disputes, is impossible given that only civil courts have the 
proper legal authority to determinatively settle such disputes. Therefore, 
a better remedy is for Washington State courts to treat church property 
disputes the same way they treat disputes arising from internal 
membership disagreements in voluntarily associated organizations. 
At first glance, this solution may seem to ignore church property 
disputes’ religious nature. But if courts correctly reframe and understand 
church property disputes as disputes between voluntarily organized 
groups or individuals over real property, the departure from the First 
Amendment-based justifications makes sense. Moving away from the 
traditional First Amendment rationale for the deference approach will not 
disturb how Washington State courts currently resolve church property 
disputes. More importantly, the departure will insulate civil courts from 
further criticisms for violating constitutional values, which in turn makes 
their decisions more authoritative and justified. 
Reframing the nature of church property disputes is not new or 
 
212. O’Sullivan Grange, 35 Wash. App. at 449–50, 667 P.2d at 1109 (“[T]he constitution and 
bylaws of the national or governing body of a beneficial association or fraternal order are binding 
upon the subordinate organizations.”). 
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revolutionary.213 Scholars have called for courts to use secular tools to 
resolve church property disputes over the past few years.214 But 
Washington State courts have already employed rationales that did not 
need First Amendment values to resolve church property disputes. Aside 
from returning to this historical method, Washington State courts can also 
incorporate other methods, such as using statutory provisions that treat 
churches as nonprofit corporations. Doing so would free civil courts from 
compulsory submission to church decisions while granting them increased 
latitude to assess which party should have property ownership based on 
the review of deeds, relationships between the parties, and internal 
governance documents. This approach would also enable courts to enforce 
valid internal organizational agreements as binding on the litigating 
parties while reserving opportunities to examine other pertinent facets of 
the underlying issue. 
Washington State defines and treats churches as nonprofit 
organizations.215 As such, civil courts can adjudicate church property 
disputes by relying on existing statutory mechanisms that govern 
nonprofits. For instance, Washington State courts have the authority to 
appoint a general or custodial receiver to oversee distribution of assets 
once a nonprofit corporation starts its dissolution process.216 While the 
statute explicitly excludes churches or their auxiliaries from most of its 
 
213. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426. U.S. 696, 728 (1976) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[W]here people had chosen to organize themselves into voluntary 
religious associations, and had agreed to be bound by the decisions of the hierarchy created to govern 
such associations, the civil courts could not be availed of to hear appeals from otherwise final 
decisions of such hierarchical authorities. The bases from which this principle was derived clearly 
had no constitutional dimension; there was not the slightest suggestion that the First Amendment or 
any other provision of the Constitution was relevant to the decision in that case.”); see also Watson 
v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 714 (1871) (“Religious organizations come before us in the same attitude as 
other voluntary associations for benevolent or charitable purposes, and their rights of property, or of 
contract, are equally under the protection of the law, and the actions of their members subject to 
its restraints.”). 
214. E.g., McConnell & Goodrich, supra note 142 (proposing that courts use ordinary principles 
of trust and property law); David Fulton, Comment, Surgical Arbitration: Excising First Amendment 
Cataracts from Religious Hierarchical Property Disputes, 2 TEX. A&M J. PROP. L. 413 (2015) 
(suggesting that parties use arbitration to settle certain questions related to church property disputes); 
Brian Schmalzbach, Note, Confusion and Coercion in Church Property Litigation, 96 VA. L. REV. 
443 (2010) (arguing for a federal statute to simplify and standardize the law of church 
property disputes).  
215. See WASH. REV. CODE. § 84.36.020(2)(a) (2020) (granting tax exemption to churches 
described as “nonprofit recognized religious denomination”); Nonprofit Organizations, WASH. STATE 
DEP’T OF REVENUE, https://dor.wa.gov/education/industry-guides/nonprofit-organizations 
[https://perma.cc/L8Y5-U7PS] (stating that “[a]n organization may be considered a ‘nonprofit’ 
organization because . . . [i]t is a church, charity, or benevolent organization”).  
216. WASH. REV. CODE § 24.03.271(3)–(8) (2020). 
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provisions,217 it still authorizes civil courts to direct how the parties should 
manage or dispose of certain assets until a full hearing is held.218 
Reflecting civil courts’ authority to settle distribution or ownership of 
nonprofit organizations’ assets, the Washington State Supreme Court has 
not shied away from carefully scrutinizing what internal organizational 
agreements say on the matter.219 
This close review of internal organizational documents is a key 
function of how Washington State courts adjudicate property disputes 
arising from an internal schism within congregational churches.220 Giving 
internal governing documents determinative effect in deciding which 
disputing party has the rightful property ownership is consistent with the 
laws of nonprofit organizations on such matters.221 More importantly, 
allowing Washington State courts to apply the principles that govern 
nonprofit organizations’ property disputes to church property disputes is 
consistent with what the Supreme Court identified as one of the strengths 
of the neutral-principles of law approach.222 The shared characteristics 
between how the Washington State courts adjudicate property disputes 
arising from nonprofit organizations and congregational churches 
therefore justify removing the First Amendment’s role in resolving 
 
217. Id. § 24.03.271(10). 
218. Id. § 24.03.271(9)(c) (referring to assets that are “charitable, religious, eleemosynary, 
benevolent, educational, or similar purposes”); see also id. § 24.03.271(3). 
219. See, e.g., In re Monks Club, Inc., 64 Wash. 2d 845, 850, 394 P.2d 804, 807 (1964) (reviewing 
amendments to a nonprofit corporation’s bylaws that stated how assets would be distributed upon 
dissolution and declaring it null). 
220. See, e.g., Church of Christ at Centerville v. Carder, 105 Wash. 2d. 204, 205, 211, 713 P.2d 
101, 102, 105 (1986) (referring to church rules to affirm the church board’s decision to remove Carder 
as preacher and affirm the church’s property ownership).  
221. 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS § 5707 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2020) (“Where a member of a nonprofit . . . corporation 
voluntarily withdraws from the corporation, the member generally forfeits all interest in the property 
of the corporation unless the applicable statutes or the articles or bylaws provide 
otherwise . . . . Members of a subordinate lodge or fraternal association who withdraw forfeit their 
interest in the lodge property and cannot invoke the rule against the enforcement of forfeiture in 
equity.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).  
222. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 607–08 (1979). 
[A] presumptive rule of majority representation, defeasible upon a showing that the identity of 
the local church is to be determined by some other means . . . would be consistent with both the 
neutral-principles analysis and the First Amendment. Majority rule is generally employed in the 
governance of religious societies. Furthermore, the majority faction generally can be identified 
without resolving any question of religious doctrine or polity . . . . Most importantly, any rule of 
majority representation can always be overcome, under the neutral-principles approach, either 
by providing, in the corporate charter or the constitution of the general church, that the identity 
of the local church is to be established in some other way, or by providing that the church 
property is held in trust for the general church and those who remain loyal to it. 
Id. (citations omitted); see also Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. 131, 140 (1872) (employing majority 
rule to resolve church property dispute).  
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property disputes between units of congregational churches. Under the 
new approach, courts reviewing internal governing documents would be 
similar to the neutral-principles approach, while recognizing all pertinent 
rules as dispositive to settle the property dispute would be how the 
deference approach operates. 
The notable exception to the court’s general unwillingness to get 
involved in internal disputes in voluntarily associated organizations is 
when property rights are at issue.223 But Grand Aerie is evidence that even 
when property rights are concerned, Washington State courts still review 
internal governing documents and enforce whatever pertinent provisions 
the organizations have. Hence, the Washington State Supreme Court’s 
long history of giving effects to fraternal organizations’ internal rules is 
significant for two reasons. First, Washington State courts can continue to 
apply the deference approach’s respect for internal church decisions as 
they do now, even if they remove the First Amendment rationale. Second, 
courts can continue to use the neutral-principles approach’s operative 
features by mandating that all church property disputes require judicial 
review of church governing documents for the sole purpose of referring 
to the relevant provisions on membership and property rights. Compelling 
courts to refer to church documents should discourage them from ignoring 
the church’s intent on how it is organized and governed, thus preventing 
the judiciary from usurping what the church units mutually and knowingly 
agreed to. Cases from other jurisdictions demonstrate that other state 
courts apply similar reasoning when resolving legal disputes between 
voluntary associations’ members or units.224 
Under this new approach, Washington State courts can apply a uniform 
doctrine to all property disputes that stem from internal feuds in 
voluntarily associated organizations without infringing on their rights to 
be governed by mutually assented rules. The current First 
Amendment-based justifications for the deference and the 
neutral-principles approaches are the only obstacle to this new solution. 
But Washington State courts can remove the roadblock if they: 
(1) classify churches as voluntarily organized nonprofit corporations and 
 
223. State ex rel. Butterworth v. Frater, 130 Wash. 501, 504, 228 P. 295, 296 (1924) (holding that 
civil courts will not interfere in disputes between a voluntary association and a member unless a 
property right is involved). 
224. See Levant v. Whitley, 755 A.2d 1036, 1046 (D.C. 2000); Harper v. Hoecherl, 14 So. 2d 179, 
180–81 (Fla. 1943); Long v. Meade, 174 P.2d 114, 116 (Kan. 1946); Irwin v. Lorio, 126 So. 669, 672 
(La. 1930); Peters v. Minn. Dep’t of Ladies of Grand Army of Republic, 58 N.W.2d 58, 60 (Minn. 
1953); Cuney v. State, 108 So. 298, 303 (Miss. 1926); Golden Lodge No. 13, Indep. Ord. of Odd 
Fellows v. Grand Lodge of Indep. Ord. of Odd Fellows, 80 P.3d 857, 859 (Colo. App. 2003); Grand 
Castle of the Golden Eagles v. Bridgeton Castle, No. 13, Knights of Golden Eagles, 40 A. 849, 849 
(N.J. Ch. 1898). 
Lee (Do Not Delete) 3/22/2021  12:06 PM 
276 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:241 
 
(2) treat them the same as other secular nonprofits and voluntary 
associations for church property dispute purposes. 
CONCLUSION 
Church property disputes should not be anomalies that force civil 
courts to adopt a special rule to resolve them. Traditionally, civil courts 
adopted different methods to adjudicate church property disputes—
namely the deference approach or the neutral-principles approach—and 
they have consistently justified the preferred method based on the First 
Amendment. Ironically, the First Amendment-based justifications are 
inherently susceptible to valid criticisms of violating the First 
Amendment. This is because no matter what approach a court uses, it will 
have to interpret certain religious matters from a secular perspective—an 
intrusion that the First Amendment prohibits. 
The best solution for Washington State courts is to treat church 
property disputes like they treat similar disputes from voluntarily 
associated organizations. Washington State courts already resolve 
property disputes or internal disagreements between members or units of 
the same voluntary associations without relying on the First Amendment. 
By treating churches the same as other secular voluntary associations, 
Washington State courts can avoid criticisms that their doctrine violates 
constitutional values. The time has come for Washington State courts to 
embrace the better method in resolving church property disputes: 
completely removing any First Amendment reliance in whatever doctrine 
they use. 
 
 
